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Friendships
Social class
InternationalismHaving international social ties carries many potential advantages, including access to novel ideas and greater
commercial opportunities. Yet little is known aboutwho formsmore international friendships. Here, we propose
social class plays a key role in determining people's internationalism.We conducted two studies to test whether
social class is related positively to internationalism (the building social class hypothesis) or negatively to interna-
tionalism (the restricting social class hypothesis). In Study 1,we found that among individuals in the United States,
social class was negatively related to percentage of friends on Facebook that are outside the United States. In
Study 2, we extended these ﬁndings to the global level by analyzing country-level data on Facebook friends
formed in 2011 (nearly 50 billion friendships) across 187 countries. We found that people from higher social
class countries (as indexed by GDP per capita) had lower levels of internationalism—that is, they made more
friendships domestically than abroad.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Forming friendships and alliances is one of themost important social
actions people take in their lives. Friendships provide social support,
opportunities for innovation and collaboration, social delights, and a
sense of community and cooperation (Dakhli & De Clercq, 2004;
Weisz & Wood, 2005). Given these functions of friendships, scientiﬁc
studies have documented that friendships are important predictors of
well-being and health (Berkman, 2001). While much of the past work
on friendships has focused on close ties, cross-national friendships are
far less well understood. Yet greater international ties can lead to
many beneﬁts, including greater peace between nations and cultural
exchanges that can foster innovation through the introduction of
novel ideas from foreign cultures (Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). Indeed,
cross-national friendships stand to enrich our knowledge of intergroup
relations (Davies, Tropp, Aron, Pettigrew, & Wright, 2011; Yzerbyt &
Demoulin, 2010) and interpersonal stratiﬁcation (Fiske, 2010).
There are well known barriers to forming friendships with people
from different groups than one's own, including distrust, intergroup
anxiety, and even prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). Yet we know
little about what factors are positively related to cross-national friend-
ships. In the present investigation, we ask how social class—bothme Aleksandr Kogan.
. This is an open access article undersubjective accounts of one's place in society relative to others and objec-
tive accounts of a person's income level (Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton,
Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012)—at the individual and national level,
predicts the tendency to form friendships with people from different
nations than one's own. The literature on power, status, and social
class yields two competing predictions, which we test in this investiga-
tion: the building and restricting social class hypotheses.
1. Competing perspectives on social class and internationalism
On the one hand, studies suggest that people from high social class
groups are action-oriented in connecting with others (Keltner,
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). At the individual level of analysis, high-
social class individuals tend to feel more positive emotion, send out
more approach-related signals (such as smiles or friendly eye contact),
and approach others to the extent that they can be useful to fulﬁlling
their needs and/or goals (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee & Galinsky, 2008).
Select studies ﬁnd that, depending on situational demands, people from
high-social class groups tend to take responsibility and be more inclined
to assist low-social class members (Brewer, 1988; Keltner, Gruenfeld,
Galinsky, & Kraus, 2010; Overbeck& Park, 2001). In light of these process-
es, one might expect upper class individuals to form more friendships
across national boundaries (Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). Objective condi-
tions of the lives of upper class individuals—where they work, travel to,the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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have more international friends. These ﬁndings and reasoning converge
on the building social class hypothesis: upper class individuals and people
from high-social class countries build up their international social capital
through the formation of more international friendships relative to their
lower class counterparts.
A competing hypothesis is found in recent analyses of status, wealth,
and social class (Kraus et al., 2012; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). This
line of reasoning holds that high social class individuals are endowed
with greater resources, and therefore less dependent upon others. As a
result, the wealthy tend to be less socially engaged with others, in par-
ticular those from different groups than their own. In keeping with this
restriction of social capital perspective, studies have found that higher
class individuals show higher patterns of nonverbal social disengage-
ment (e.g. doodling) compared to individuals from lower class back-
grounds (Kraus & Keltner, 2009), they prove to be less responsive to
others' suffering, and they tend to share less with others (Piff, Kraus,
Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, &
Keltner, 2012; Stellar, Manzo, Kraus, & Keltner, 2012). By contrast,
lower class individuals have perhaps more to gain from diversifying
their social connections and prove to be more oriented towards
reaching out and connecting with others (Piff et al., 2010). These ﬁnd-
ings and theoretical analysis lend themselves to a competing hypothesis
that we tested in this investigation, the restricting social class hypothesis:
upper class individuals will form fewer international friendships than
low-social class people.
2. Testing the building and restricting social class hypotheses
In the present research, we tested these two competing hypotheses
aboutwho is likely to form friendshipswith people fromdifferent coun-
tries than one's own. We did so in two complementary studies, one at
the individual level of analysis, and a second at thenational level of anal-
ysis. In Study 1, we tested the relationship between personal social class
(incomeand social class) among individuals in the United States and the
percentage of their total Facebook friends (a proxy of social relation-
ships) that came from outside the United States. In Study 2, we exam-
ined the relationship between every friendship made on Facebook in
2011 and GDP per capita (as a proxy of social class).
Several aspects of the Facebook platform allow us to overcome cer-
tain classic challenges in social sciences. First, Facebook's user base is
massive, spanning over 1.3 billion users; thus, in our second study, our
ﬁndings provide insights based on data from every corner of the earth
and most walks of life. With growing concerns about the robustness of
ﬁndings based on Western, educated, student samples—indeed, even
cognitive psychology ﬁndings vary massively across cultures—such a
huge, culturally, ethnically, and class mixed sample provides a vital
step forward to generalizing effects (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan,
2010). Second, Facebook friendship structuremirrors real-world friend-
ships (Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012). In fact, unlike other social
networking sites, real-world friendships tend to be a precursor to be-
coming Facebook friends (Ross et al., 2009). These ﬁndings highlight
the validity of using Facebook friendships as a proxy for a person's social
contacts. However, even given these ﬁndings, we suggest that Facebook
friendships should ultimately be treated as a proxy for real relationships
as there are almost certainly social ties on Facebook that are with indi-
viduals that users have onlymet once or not at all. Facebook friendships
provide a convenient way to approximate a person's social sphere, but
there is some error in this metric. Similarly, income, social class, and
GDP per capita are powerful proxies for individual and national social
class given the central role that money plays in people's determinations
of social class (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2011). Third, using Facebook
friendships allow us to quantify the percentage of a person's friends
that are international without relying on self-report—thus, many classic
biases are not threats to the interpretation of the ﬁndings. Indeed, it
would be exceedingly difﬁcult to quantify the number of internationalsocial ties a person has since—by virtue of thembeing international—the
individual is unlikely to see them often and thus more likely to forget
them when asked to make a list of friends.
Our research makes two principal contributions to the intergroup
and social class literatures. By demonstrating how social class underpins
the creation of cross-national friendships, we shed light on how people
reach across social divides and form connections to disparate others, a
phenomenon we know to be important for cultural change, increased
chances of innovation, and less hostile intergroup attitudes (Maddux
& Galinsky, 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). In addition to underscoring
how social class is amajor driver of these cross-national friendships, we
also provide support for the idea that, despite status being beneﬁcial in
many aspects of everyday life, it affects the composition of social net-
works in a way that reduces international diversity. Thus, our research
strengthens and enhances a budding line of evidence (Kraus et al.,
2012; Piff et al., 2012) that social class carries certain risks as well as
advantages.
3. Study 1
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants and procedure
We recruited 1069 individuals from Amazon's Mechanical Turk
who lived in the United States to participate in the study in exchange
for $1.00. At the beginning of the study, participants completed a
consent form which detailed all parts of the study. No deception
was used. Of these individuals, 857 participants consented to autho-
rizing our Facebook app to gather some information from their pro-
ﬁles automatically. This information included their total number of
friends and their friends' current location—we note that friend loca-
tion data was not available for all friends, but it was available for the
majority of friends. Facebook researchers were not directly involved
in Study 1—the data collection was done independently through the
Cambridge team's own app.We focused only on the participants who
had at least one Facebook friend (sample N = 815). These partici-
pants had on average 353 friends, and all together had 287,739
friends.
For each participant, we examined their friends' current location,
calculating the percentage of friends who lived outside the United
States, which served as our metric of internationalism. In examining
the internationalism histogram, we found extreme positive skew:
the vast majority of participants had a small percentage of interna-
tional friends (on average, 4%), with a small minority having high
levels of international friendships. Since such outliers can extremely
skew the results of a regression model, we followed the recommen-
dations of Tabachnick and Fidell (2006), z-scoring all international-
ism values, excluding any values more than 3 SDs away from the
mean, z-scoring the remaining values, excluding any values of the
new z-scores that are 3 SDs away from the mean, and so forth until
the z-scores revealed no scores more than 3 SDs out. This procedure
left 671 individuals for analyses (mean age = 28.6, sd = 9.2; 54% fe-
male), with internationalism scores ranging from 0 to 14% (mean =
4%, SD= 3%). Since these scores were still skewed positively, we nat-
ural log transformed the data, which created an approximately nor-
mal distribution of results.
Importantly, we note that we ran all models without excluding the
outliers, instead simply natural log transforming the data to account
for skew—and all results in that procedure were consistent with the re-
portedﬁndings below.We also ran allmodels using a Poisson regression
without removing any outliers, as a further alternative to taking the nat-
ural log, and again found the same pattern of results highly signiﬁcant.
We therefore present the results yielded by the ﬁrst approach since it
offers the best interpretability and protection from bias due to outliers,
but note the conclusions of our paper are not dependent on the chosen
method of analysis and/or outlier removal.
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Participants responded to two items aimed to measure their social
class: (a) income, “What is your total annual household income?”
(1 = Under $10,000, 11 = Above $100,000) and (b) social class,
“Where would you place yourself on the following spectrum for social
class?” (1=Working class, 5=Upper class). Participants also indicated
how long they have been members of Facebook (months, years) and
how frequently they use it (1 = Never; 5 = Several times a day).
While there was some skew towards lower values for both these met-
rics, the skew was below 1 for both. Furthermore, when conducting all
analyses using the logged versions of the variables, we found the same
pattern of results. Thus, we have used the non-logged versions of the
variables for ease of interpretation.
4. Results
We included several key control variables in all models that could
potentially suppress or confound the association between social
class and internationalism. First, we controlled for age, because we
found that older individuals tend to have higher social class and
use Facebook less in our data. Second, gender is related to both social
engagement (women slightly more likely to have more friends) and
social class (trending towards lower income), so we controlled for
this variable as well. Third, Facebook users with more friends had
more international friends in our data—likely because they have
larger social networks. Thus, in all our models, we controlled for par-
ticipant age, gender, natural log number of total Facebook friends,
length of using Facebook, and self-reported frequency of using
Facebook. We note that all effects held even without controlling for
age or gender. However, when removing all Facebook control vari-
ables, we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects. This is to be expected, how-
ever, as Facebook can only function as an effective proxy of social
relationship for people who actually use Facebook; therefore, usage
rates need to be accounted for.
We set up three regression models to test the building and res-
tricting social class hypotheses—which yielded contrasting predictions
concerning whether social class is positively or negatively predictive
of internationalism. In each model, we tested a different social class in-
dicator to establish robustness of our effects—speciﬁcally, in Model 1,
we used income as the predictor; in Model 2, we used self-reported so-
cial class as the predictor; and ﬁnally, in Model 3, we used a composite
of income and social class as the predictor. We did this because the two
indicators of social class often only moderately correlate with one an-
other, and can be thought of as objective and subjective forms of social
class (Kraus et al., 2012). We found that higher income, b = − .05,
CI95(− .08, − .02), rpartial = − .13, t(477) = −2.96, p b .01, self-
reported social class, b = − .18, CI95(− .29, − .07), rpartial = − .15,
t(476) = −3.33, p b .01, and the composite of the two, b = − .09,
CI95(− .15, − .04), rpartial = − .15, t(479) = −3.37, p b .01, were
each negatively related to internationalism. In examining interna-
tionalism percentages between low (−1SD social class) and high-
social class (+1SD social class) individuals, the models indicate
that low-social class people have nearly 50% more international
friends (2.9% internationalism) than high-social class people (2.0%
internationalism). Thus, these results provide support for the
restricting social class hypothesis.
5. Study 2
In Study 1, we showed that among individuals living in the United
States, self-reported social class is negatively related to international-
ism, thus providing support for the restricting social class hypothesis for
personal social class. In Study 2, we examined how GDP per capita pre-
dicts the percentage of Facebook friendships that are international in
each nation in the world. In transitioning to data at the national level,
we therefore tested the two competing hypotheses across culturesthat vary dramatically in terms of their social values, economic develop-
ment, religion, political organization, and self-construals, thus allaying
some concerns about potential biases of Western samples (Henrich
et al., 2010). It's important to note that Study 2 does not intend to
extend the insights of Study 1 at an individual level—instead, Study 2
focuses onmacro-level, cultural effects, and thus it would be premature
to take its results as equivalent to conducting individual level stud-
ies around the world to provide universal evidence for our Study 1
individual-level effect.
5.1. Method
Facebook provided data on every friendship formed in 2011 in
every country in the world at the national aggregate level. These
data set included a total of 57,457,192,520 friendships. From these
data, we knew how many friendships were made within each coun-
try (domestic friendships) and also how many friendships were
made between every country pair (international friendships). We
note that we did not receive data on individuals—but rather only
the macro-level, national sums. While most countries had at least
tens of millions of friendships formed, a small number had relatively
few. Thus, we removed from our analyses nations with less than 1
million friendships. This left 204 countries in the sample. We quanti-
ﬁed social class as GDP per capita in 2011 (World Bank, 2012). Full
data across all variables was available for 175 countries which
make up the majority of the global population (5,291,704,711) and
Facebook's user base (952,818,100). For these countries, we exam-
ined every domestic (a total of 48,458,812,050 friendships) and in-
ternational friendship (a total of 7,572,368,093 friendships) made
on Facebook in 2011. For each country, we calculated an internation-
alism score by dividing total international friendships by total
friendships (2 ∗ domestic + international)—we note that domestic
friendships were multiplied by 2 because every international friend-
ship is counted twice (once for each nation part of the friendship)
and to keep the percentages consistent, domestic friendships need to
be counted twice (once for each person who can claim the friendship in
the nation). Since GDP per capita was highly positively skewed, we nor-
malized it by taking the natural log. We also included net migration per
capita (latestﬁgures for each country fromWorld Bank) as a control to ac-
count for the possibility of migration explaining our effects. There was
substantial skew in net migration; we therefore logged the scores to
make themmore normally distributed.
6. Results
Fig. 1 shows two worldmaps: (a) percentage of internationalism on
Facebook and (b) GDP per capita. As thesemaps suggest, and in keeping
with the individual level results from Study 1, there is a negative corre-
lation between GDP per capita (national social class) and percentage of
Facebook friends that are foreign in a nation (internationalismlog),
r=− .18, CI95(− .32,− .04), t(172) =−2.44, p= .02, thus providing
support on a global level for the restricting social class hypothesis. Exam-
ining low-social class (−1SD GDP per capita) and high-social class
(+1SD GDP per capita) countries, people from low-social class coun-
tries had on average 35% of their friendships be international while
people from high social class countries on average had 28% of their
friendship be international. We also considered potentially control-
ling for variables that could inﬂuence the relationship. However,
the difﬁculty with these variables (i.e., percentage of population
with internet, rate of travel, immigration) is that they tend to be
heavily correlated with GDP per capita. For instance, GDP per capita
and total friendships per capita are correlated at r = .73. Thus, in-
cluding them both in a model would greatly change the meaning of
both variables, and in turn change the meaning of any potential cor-
relation. Given these issues—and also the convergence of the global
correlation with the individual level correlations presented in
Fig. 1. Panel A: Internationalism. Panel B: Log GDP per capita.
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proach is to keep the model as a simple correlation between GDP per
capita and internationalism without adding controls. However, net mi-
gration proved an exception to this because (a) it had a relatively mod-
erate correlation with GDP per capita (r= .49) and (b) it represented a
potential mediation mechanism of our effects. We therefore ran aregression model controlling for net migration. We did not ﬁnd evi-
dence to support a relationship between netmigration and internation-
alism, b= .04, CI95(− .03, .12), rpartial = .10, t(172) = 1.27, p= .21; in
contrast, the effect of GDP per capita not only remained signiﬁcant and
negative, but in fact increased in magnitude, b = − .03, CI95(− .05,
− .01), rpartial = − .25, t(172) = −3.34, p b .01.
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Friendships can provide wide-ranging beneﬁts and can be closely
related to health, trust and well-being. The barriers to forming
friendships with individuals from groups that differ from one's
own are well-known, and include in group bias, intergroup anxiety,
and prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). In the present investiga-
tion, we relied on individual and national level data to ask how so-
cial class, both objective (income) and subjective (perceived social
class), personal (individual level) and national (nation level), inﬂu-
ence the likelihood of forming friendships on Facebook with indi-
viduals from different countries.
The literature on power and social class justiﬁed two competing pre-
dictions. Given the association between power and social approach
(Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Magee & Galinsky, 2008),
one might expect the wealthy to reach out and form more friendships
with people from different groups—the building social class hypothesis.
In contrast, given the tendency for the upper class to be socially disen-
gaged with other individuals (Hall, Coats, & LeBeau, 2005; Kraus &
Keltner, 2009), and the well documented tendency for lower class indi-
viduals to be more prosocially oriented to others (Piff et al., 2010), one
might expect the wealthy and higher social class to privilege friendships
within one's own group, and not have as many international friends—the
restricting social class hypothesis.
In line with the restricting social class hypothesis, our results across
two studies at the micro-individual and macro-national levels showed
that people and nations with greater objective and subjective social
class had fewer international friends on Facebook. In Study 1, people
who reported that they had higher income and were from upper class
categories had fewer international friends than individuals who had
lower incomes and self-identiﬁed with lower class categories. In Study
2, wealthier countries, as indexed in per capita GDP, had fewer interna-
tional friends than poorer countries. Despite having fewer resources at
their disposal, it is actually low-social class people and poorer nations
who tend to have friendship networks populated with more interna-
tional connections.
These ﬁndings make a number of important contributions to the so-
cial class and social network literatures. First, the negative link between
social class and international friendshipsmay underscore a tendency for
high-social class people to accrue relational resources such as social sup-
port in their local vicinity. According to the self-reinforcing account of
social class (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), high-social class people tend to
think and act in ways that reinforce their own social class. However,
by forming fewer international friendships (relative to their low-social
class counterparts), high-social class people may be at risk of strength-
ening their local social class at the expense of improving their broader
social class.
Second, theory and research highlight the value of developing weak
ties to others in distant social circles because these ties offer access to re-
sources not likely to be found in one's immediate social circle (Agrawal,
Kapur, &McHale, 2008; Burt, 2008; Granovetter, 2005). An encouraging
sign is that low-social class people tend to have greater access to these
resources on account of having more international friendships. Thus,
contrary to research describing the plight of low-social class individuals
with poor access to social resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), our ﬁnd-
ings point to international friendships as a means by which low-social
class individuals can beneﬁt from the resources inhering in social ties.
Third, our study showcases a new approach to studying internation-
alism at the global level—through the usage of nation-level socialmedia.
This approach opens the doors for new investigations of themicro- and
macro-forces that promote or inhibit internationalism. One particularly
fruitful avenue is to study how cultural differences—on dimensions such
as individualism-collectivism—are related to internationalism. Several
datasets are available at the nation level that have cross-cultural scores,
including Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions (Hofstede & Bond, 1984),
Schwartz Cultural Values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), and the WorldValues Cultural Dimensions (Minkov & Hofstede, 2010). These scores
can be used to probe the relationship between culture and internation-
alism in future work.
We do note that there are several important limitations to our work
which require important future extensions. First, both of our studies
were correlational, and thus making strong causal claims at this stage
is premature. While we believe that it is most likely the causal arrow
that ﬂows from social class to internationalism, explicit experimental
work is needed to test this thesis. Second, our sample in Study 1
consisted of MTurk users which are not representative of the general US
population. While MTurk users tend to be as good—if not better—than
typical undergraduate samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, &Gosling, 2011), fu-
ture work should endeavor to recruit a nationally representative sample
to further corroborate the results. Third, while we believe that Facebook
friendships offer a powerful proxy for studying social relationships—and
previous work does support the notion that Facebook friendships tend
to mirror real world relationships (Wilson et al., 2012)—further replica-
tion of the ﬁndings using traditional self-report metrics of friendships
would be a welcomed further validation of our approach. Fourth, we do
not know the place of birth of participants in Study 1; thus, it is possible
that migration ﬂows could be a potential mechanism behind this effect.
Future work should explore this issue in greater detail. However, we do
note that we found evidence against a migration explanation in Study 2.
Fifth, the effect sizes were of a small-to-moderate nature in both Studies
1 and 2. This is not surprising as there are likely a largemultiplicity of fac-
tors involved in internationalism; however, it does highlight that we
should be careful in over-interpreting the effects and their suggested
consequences.
In aworldwithmore global connections than ever, some individuals
are creating more international ties than others. Despite the beneﬁts of
having international connections, and the fact that high-social class
people should be better positioned to travel and meet people from dif-
ferent countries, our results provide one empirical demonstration as
to how low-social class people may actually stand to beneﬁt most
from a highly international and globalized social world.Acknowledgements
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